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Abstract—This paper presents a new dynamic pricing model
(a.k.a. real-time pricing) that reflects startup costs of generators.
Dynamic pricing, which is a method to control demand by pricing
electricity at hourly (or more often) intervals, has been studied
by many researchers. They assume that the cost functions of
suppliers are convex, although they may be nonconvex because
of the startup costs of generators in practice. We provide a
dynamic pricing model that takes into account such cost functions
within the settings of unit commitment problems (UCPs). Our
model gives convex hull price (CHP), which has not been used
in the context of dynamic pricing, though it is known that the
CHP minimizes the uplift payment which is disadvantageous
to suppliers for a given demand. In addition, we apply an
iterative algorithm based on the subgradient method to solve
our model. Numerical experiments show the efficiency of our
model on reducing uplift payments. The prices determined by
our algorithm give sufficiently small uplift payments in a realistic
computational time.
Index Terms—Convex hull pricing, unit commitment problem,
uplift payments, dynamic pricing, electricity market, subgradient
method.
I. INTRODUCTION
DYNAMIC pricing (a.k.a. real-time pricing) is a methodof invoking a response in demand by pricing electricity at
hourly (or more often) intervals. There are many studies about
dynamic pricing. For example, Roozbehani et al. [2] proposed
a nonlinear control model in a real-time market, in which
prices are updated on moment-to-moment basis. They focused
on the stability of the market, and analyzed stabilizing effects
of their model by using volatility measures of the prices.
On the other hand, Miyano and Namerikawa [3] proposed a
dynamic pricing model in a day-ahead market, in which a
market operator sets next day’s hourly (or more often) prices.
Their price is given by the Lagrange multiplier of a social
welfare maximization problem. They studied an algorithm
based on a steepest descent method to control the load levels,
and showed its convergence. Their numerical results show the
efficiency of their algorithm.
These studies assume that the cost functions of suppliers
are convex, although they may be nonconvex because of the
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startup costs of generators in practice (in fact, there are many
studies that deal such cost functions within the settings of
unit commitment problems (UCPs)). Thus, these models do
not fully reflect the startup costs to the prices, and would
be disadvantageous to the suppliers. One of the measures
showing the disadvantages is the uplift payment which is the
gap between the suppliers’ optimal profit and actual profit.
If the cost functions are truly convex, a marginal cost price
can make the uplift payments zero. However, if not, none of
pricing models may make the uplift payments zero. The uplift
payments for owners of many generators tend to be relatively
small and can often be ignored. However, this may not be true
for small producers since startup costs occupy a large portion
of the total cost of electricity generation.
Recently, under the assumption that the demand is given
(i.e., out of the context of the dynamic pricing), several pricing
models [4], [5], [6], [7], [8] have been proposed in order
to reduce the uplift payments. The most successful pricing
model is the convex hull pricing (CHP) model (a.k.a. extended
locational marginal pricing model) proposed by Gribik et al.
[5]. The authors theoretically showed that the CHP is given by
the Lagrange multiplier for the UCP, and the CHP minimizes
the uplift payment for a given demand. Many researchers
have studied algorithms to calculate the CHP, e.g., [9], [10].
However, they have not been used in the context of dynamic
pricing.
This paper presents a new dynamic pricing model based on
the CHP. First, we formulate a social welfare maximization
problem, which maximizes the sum of the consumers’ utility
and the suppliers’ profit under the condition that supply and
demand are equal, with nonconvex cost functions of the
suppliers within the settings of the UCP. Then we applied
a CHP approach, which is invented for the UCP, to the social
welfare maximization problem; our model takes into account
both the startup costs and dynamic demand. We prove that
the CHP is given by a solution of its dual problem, i.e.,
the Lagrange multiplier for the social welfare maximization
problem. This implies that our price minimizes the uplift
payment for the equilibrium demand. Since our pricing model
has a nonsmooth objective function including 0-1 integer
variables, it is difficult to be solved by exact optimization
algorithms. Thus we provide an approximate pricing algorithm
based on the subgradient method. Numerical results show that
our pricing model leads to smaller uplift payments compared
with standard dynamic pricing models. Moreover, our algo-
rithm achieves sufficiently small uplift payments in a realistic
number of iterations and computational time.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section II
presents the setting of a dynamic electricity market. Section
2III presents the definition of the UCP and the CHP. Section
IV introduces a new dynamic pricing model based on a social
welfare maximization that includes the UCP. In addition, we
theoretically show that our pricing model leads to the CHPs.
We also provide a pricing algorithm based on the subgradient
method. Numerical results are reported in Section V. We give
conclusions and list possible directions for research in Section
VI.
In what follows, we denote column vectors in boldface, e.g.,
x ∈ Rn whose i-th element is xi ∈ R (i = 1, 2, . . . , n).
II. MARKET MODEL
We will begin by describing the electricity market model
and existing pricing models. Assumptions in this section are
made along the lines of [2], [3]. There are three kinds of
participants in an electricity market: consumers, suppliers,
and an independent system operator (ISO). The suppliers
(or consumers) decide their electric power production (or
consumption) so as to maximize their profit (or utility, re-
spectively) at a given electricity price. The ISO is a non-
profit institution that is independent of the suppliers and the
consumers. The ISO makes hourly (or more often) pricing
decisions to balance supply and demand. We assume that
resistive losses can be ignored. Further, there are no line
capacity constraints and reserve capacity constraints.
A. Supply and demand models
To make our model simple, we suppose a single represen-
tative supplier (or consumer) whose response represents the
macro behavior of all suppliers (or consumers), and focus on a
single-period model that deals with each period independently
(i.e., a model with that does not take into account dynamical
changes). Our model and algorithm can be extended to a
multi-agent and multi-period model, as is shown in [4]. Let
u : [0,∞)→ [0,∞) be the utility function of the representa-
tive consumer, which represents the dollar value of consuming
electricity. Let v : [0,∞) → [0,∞] be the cost function of
the representative supplier, which represents the dollar cost of
producing electricity. For a given price p > 0, the consumer
(or supplier) makes their demand d(p) (or supply s(p)) to
maximize their utility (or profit, respectively), i.e.,
d(p) ∈ arg max
d≥0
u(d)− pd, (1)
s(p) ∈ arg max
y≥0
py − v(y). (2)
A conceptual illustration is given in Fig. 1. The existing works
[2], [3] assume the following assumption:
Assumption 1 ([2], [3]). The utility function u is class-C2,
monotonically increasing, and strictly concave on [0,∞). The
cost function v is class-C2, monotonically increasing, and
strictly convex on [0,∞).
Note that if there exist a solution of (1) (or (2)), it is unique
under Assumption 1.
Fig. 1. Illustration of supply and demand models. The left panel illustrates the
consumer’s problem (1), and the right panel illustrates the supplier’s problem
(2). The vertical solid lines represent optimal utility and profit for each agent.
In this case, the supplier has two optimal solutions. The cost function v in the
right panel is nonconvex and discontinuous. We deal with such cost functions
in this paper.
B. Pricing model
The ISO is a non-profit institution and independent from
the consumer and the supplier. The objective of the ISO is to
manage the electricity market, especially, to balance demand
and supply. In the electricity market, neither the consumer and
the supplier do not bid. Thus, the ISO should match the levels
of demand d(p) and supply s(p) by making an appropriate
pricing decision p. Here, it is natural to assume that the utility
function u of the consumer is unknown to the ISO, while the
cost function v of the supplier is not necessarily known to the
ISO. Accordingly, an electricity price p is determined through
the following procedure:
Algorithm 1. 1) The ISO sets the initial price p0, and
sends it to the consumer and supplier. k ← 0.
2) The consumer and supplier respectively determine the
demand d(pk) and the supply s(pk), and send them to
the ISO.
3) If there is a gap between the demand d(pk) and supply
s(pk), the ISO reassign a new price pk+1 to manage
the balance of supply and demand, and send it to the
consumer and supplier again. k← k + 1.
4) Step 2 and 3 are repeated.
Fig. 2. Schematic views of the electricity market model.
Miyano and Namerikawa [3] proposed a pricing model
based on social welfare maximization problem with the
supply-demand balance constraint. The social welfare is rep-
resented as the sum of the consumer’s utility and supplier’s
profit:
{u(d)− pd}+ {py − v(y)}. (3)
Since we assumed that the resistive losses can be ignored, the
supply-demand balance constraint is d = y. Consequently, we
3obtain the following social welfare maximization problem:
max
d≥0,y≥0
u(d)− v(y) s.t. d = y. (4)
Or more simply,
max
d≥0
u(d)− v(d). (5)
However, the ISO cannot solve (4) (or (5)) directly since the
utility function u is unknown to the ISO. Therefore, the fol-
lowing partial Lagrangian dual problem of (4) is alternatively
considered in [3]:
min
λ
ϕ(λ), (6)
where
ϕ(λ) = max
d≥0,y≥0
u(d)− v(y) + λ(y − d)
= max
d≥0
{u(d)− λd} +max
y≥0
{λy − v(y)}. (7)
Since the maximization problems in (7) correspond to (1) and
(2), the ISO can make the consumer and supplier solve them
by sending λ as a price. This mechanism allows the ISO to
solve (6) by using the steepest descent method (See [3] for
details). The following lemma is well known (e.g. [3], [11]).
Lemma 1. Suppose that (d∗, y∗) is an optimal solution of
(4), and λ∗ is an optimal solution of (6). If Assumption 1 is
satisfied, d∗ = d(λ∗) and y∗ = s(λ∗) hold.
λ∗ is called the Lagrange multiplier for (4). Lemma 1 states
that the demand d(λ∗) and the supply s(λ∗) maximize the
social welfare (3), and therefore, the Lagrange multiplier λ∗
can be regarded as an optimal price.
These results hold under the assumption that the cost
function v is convex. Here, we consider an electricity market
model with a nonconvex cost function within the setting of
the unit commitment problem (UCP) and provide an efficient
pricing model for it.
III. CONVEX HULL PRICING MODEL
In this section, we will introduce the convex hull pricing
(CHP) model (a.k.a. extended locational marginal pricing
model) proposed by Gribik et al. [5]. Note that the models
in this section do not take into account dynamic demand; We
assume that the demand is given.
A. Unit commitment problem
First, we consider the supplier’s cost function. We assume
that the supplier has several types of generators that might have
different variable cost functions and startup costs as shown in
Fig. 3. The supplier would like to minimize the generating cost
for a given demand y. Then, the cost function v : [0,∞) →
[0,∞] for the supplier can be represented as the optimal value
of the following optimization problem:
v(y) :=
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
inf
g,z
∑
jCj(gj) +
∑
jSjzj
s.t.
∑
jgj = y
mjzj ≤ gj ≤Mjzj, zj ∈ {0, 1}, ∀j,
(8)
Fig. 3. Example of a cost function of generator j. Sj denotes the startup cost
and Cj(gj) denotes the lower semicontinuous variable cost for an output gj .
Fig. 4. Illustration of the uplift payment. In this picture, py represents net
sales. The margin between py and v(y) represents the profit for the supplier.
In this case, the optimal profit for the supplier is obtained at s(p). However,
demand d is given and the supplier has to supply d. Thus, the actual profit
for the supplier is obtained at d. The gap between the optimal profit and the
actual profit is called the uplift payment. It is formulated as (9).
where Cj(gj) is a lower semicontinuous generating cost func-
tion for an output gj ; Sj denotes the startup cost; mj and Mj
denote the minimum and maximum outputs; and zj represents
a decision to commit generator j. Problem (8) is called a unit
commitment problem (UCP). The optimal value function v of
the UCP is characterized by lower semicontinuity, and it may
be nonconvex and discontinuous.
B. Convex hull price
A number of studies have proposed pricing models in the
settings of UCP. Some of them (e.g. [4], [5], [6], [7]) have
tried to reduce the uplift payment which is defined as follow.
Definition 1 (Uplift payment). Suppose that a demand y is
given. The uplift payment Π(p; y) for a price p is defined as
follows:
Π(p; y) := sup
x
{px− v(x)} − {py − v(y)}. (9)
A conceptual illustration is given in Fig. 4. The first term
of (9) represents the maximum profit for the supplier, that is
realizable under a price p. The second term of (9) represents
the actual profit for the supplier under a price p and the given
demand y. The uplift payment can be regarded as a measure
of disadvantage for the supplier, or as a cost for the ISO to
incentive the supplier to supply the given demand y under the
price p. Therefore, it is natural to find the price that minimizes
the uplift payment.
Such a price can be obtained by the convex hull pricing
(CHP) model (a.k.a. extended locational marginal pricing
model) proposed by Gribik et al. [5]. Before introducing the
CHP, we define the convex hull of the cost function v(y):
4Fig. 5. Illustration of the convex hull vh of the cost function v. The CHP
model uses the subgradient of vh at the given demand d as a price ph.
Definition 2 (Convex hull of the cost function v). The convex
hull vh of the cost function v is defined as
vh(y) := inf
µ
{µ | (y, µ) ∈ conv(epi(v))},
where conv(A) is the convex hull of a set A, and epi(v)
denotes the epigraph of v.
We illustrate the convex hull vh of the cost function v in
Fig. 5. The convex hull vh can be seen as the largest convex
function that is bounded above by v at any point in its domain.
In addition, it is known that vh is coincide with biconjugate
(i.e., convex conjugate of convex conjugate) of v, if v is lower
semicontinuous (see [12]). Note that vh may be a nonsmooth
function. Now, we can define the CHP.
Definition 3 (Convex hull price). The convex hull price ph is
defined as the subgradient of the convex hull vh of the cost
function v at a given demand y 1, i.e.,
ph ∈ ∂vh(y).
It is difficult to calculate the CHP according to the definition
because the explicit function form of v(·) and its convex hull
vh(·) are generally too complicated to compute. To address
this issue, Gribik et al. investigated the following important
properties of the CHP in connection with duality theory.
Proposition 1 ([5]). Suppose that λ∗ be an optimal solution
of the following partial Lagrangian dual problem of (8):
max
λ
∣∣∣∣∣
min
g,z
∑
jCj(gj) +
∑
jSjzj + λ(y −
∑
jgj)
s.t. mjzj ≤ gj ≤Mjzj , zj ∈ {0, 1}, ∀j.
(10)
Then, λ∗ is a convex hull price, i.e.,
λ∗ ∈ ∂vh(y).
Moreover, λ∗ minimizes the uplift payment Π(·; y), i.e.,
λ∗ ∈ arg min
p≥0
Π(p; y).
Proposition 1 states that the Lagrangian multiplier for (8)
gives the CHP, and the CHP is the best price in the sense
of reducing the uplift payment Π(·; y). Many researcher have
studied algorithms for (10), e.g., [9], [10]. However, there still
remains a difficulty to solve a mixed integer programming
problem in (10).
1Note that the convex hull price coincides with the marginal cost price if
v is convex and differentiable.
IV. PRICING MODEL AND ALGORITHM
In this section, we present a new dynamic pricing model
and algorithm that deals with the nonconvex cost function v
of (8). Here, we assume that the consumer’s utility function u
is concave, non-decreasing, limd→0 u˙(d) = 0.
A. Pricing model
By adding v of (8) to (4), we derive a new social welfare
maximization problem as follows:
max
g,z,d
u(d)−
{∑
jCj(gj) +
∑
jSjzj
}
s.t.
∑
jgj = d, d ≥ 0 (11)
zjmj ≤ gj ≤ zjMj, zj ∈ {0, 1}. ∀j,
Since the ISO does not know the utility function u, it cannot
solve (11). Therefore, we alternatively consider a partial
Lagrangian dual problem of (11). For notational simplicity,
let X denotes the feasible set for outputs g and commitment
decisions z, i.e.,
X := {(g, z) | mjzj ≤ gj ≤Mjzj, zj ∈ {0, 1}, ∀j}.
The partial Lagrangian dual problem of (11) is formulated by
adding v of the UCP (8) to (6) as follows:
min
λ
ϕ(λ), (12)
where
ϕ(λ) : = max
d≥0
{u(d)− λd}
+ max
(g,z)∈X
{
λ
∑
jgj −
{∑
jCj(gj) +
∑
jSjzj
}}
.
(13)
The objective function ϕ may be nonsmooth because of the
nonsmoothness of the cost function v. Note that the problems
(11) and (12) take into account price-sensitive demands. Hence
they are different from existing CHP models such as those in
[5], [9], [10]. Now we have reached the following result.
Proposition 2. The following statements hold:
1) The partial Lagrangian dual problem (12) has an opti-
mal solution (λ∗, g∗, z∗, d∗).
2) The problem (12) is equivalent to
max
d≥0
u(d)− vh(d),
3) λ∗ is a convex hull price, i.e.,
λ∗ ∈ ∂vh(d∗).
Proof. The idea behind the proof of 1) is to use the general
version of Weierstrass’ Theorem [12], which states that ϕ has
a minimum point if ϕ is a closed2 proper3 function and has
a nonempty and bounded level set. From duality theory it is
known that ϕ is lower semicontinuous, and this guarantees the
closedness of ϕ. For all λ < 0, ϕ(λ) = ∞ holds since the
2A function f is said to be closed if epi(f) is a closed set.
3A function f is said to be proper if there exists x ∈ Rn such that f(x) 6=
∞ and there does not exist x′ ∈ Rn such that f(x′) = −∞.
5first term in (13) is infinite, ∞. For all λ ≥ 0, the first term in
(13) is finite, and an optimal solution exists. The second term
in (13) is also finite, and an optimal solution exists because of
the compactness of X . Thus, if λ∗ exists, λ∗ is a nonnegative
number and (g∗, z∗, d∗) also exists (This implies that d ≤∑
j gj is an effective constraint). Let us choose γ ∈ R so that
the level set L = {λ | ϕ(λ) ≤ γ} ∈ (0,∞) is non-empty.
From (13), we have
ϕ(λ) ≥ u(0) + λ
∑
jMj − (
∑
jCj(Mj) +
∑
jSj)
for any λ. The right-hand side of the inequality is derived by
setting d = 0, gj = Mj , and zj = 1 to (13). There exists
a sufficiently large λˆ > 0 such that ϕ(λˆ) > γ. Hence, L is
bounded, and the conditions on the existence of a minimum
point of ϕ are satisfied.
The remaining parts can be obtained by mimicking the
argument in [5]. The second term in (13) is written as
max
η,(g,z)∈X
{
λη −
{∑
jCj(gj) +
∑
jSjzj
}
| η =
∑
jgj
}
= max
η
{λη − v(η)} = vc(λ),
where vc is the convex conjugate function of v. Problem (12)
can be expressed as
min
λ
ϕ(λ) = min
λ
max
d≥0
{u(d)− λd+ vc(λ)}
= max
d≥0
min
λ
{u(d)− λd+ vc(λ)}
= max
d≥0
{u(d)− vcc(d)},
where vcc is the biconjugate function of v, i.e., the convex
conjugate function of vc. The second equality holds from [12,
Prop. 2.6.4]. To prove 3), we obtain the following result for
all d ≥ 0:
vcc(d) = sup
λ
{dλ− vc(λ)}
≥ dλ∗ − vc(λ∗)
= dλ∗ − vc(λ∗) + λ∗d∗ − λ∗d∗
= vcc(d∗) + λ∗(d− d∗).
This implies that λ∗ is a subgradient of vcc at d∗. Since vcc =
vh holds (see [12]), this completes the proof.
Proposition 2 states that the Lagrange multiplier λ∗ for the
social welfare maximization problem (11) gives a CHP. This
implies that λ∗ minimizes the uplift payment at the equilibrium
demand d∗. Thus, it is reasonable to set λ∗ as a price.
B. Subgradient algorithm
The fact that the dual function ϕ in (12) is convex and lower
semicontinuous is known from duality theory. Using a basic
optimization method, the dual problem (12) can be solved in
the electricity market model. Here we provide the following
subgradient algorithm for (12).
Algorithm 2. Set the step size γk > 0 (k = 1, 2, ..., N).
1) The ISO sets the initial price λ0. k ← 1.
2) According to the given price λk, the consumer and
supplier adjust their respective demand dk and supply
∑
jg
k
j by solving the following utility and profit maxi-
mization problems:
dk ∈ arg max
d≥0
u(d)− λkd,
(gk, zk) ∈
arg max
(g,z)∈X
λk
∑
jgj − {
∑
jCj(gj) +
∑
jSjzj}.
3) The ISO updates the price λk+1 as
λk+1 = λk − γk(
∑
jg
k
j − d
k).
k ← k + 1.
4) Repeat steps 2 and 3 N times. The ISO then accepts the
price λN . The scheduled levels of production and load
are both dN .
It is known that
∑
jg
k
j − d
k is a subgradient of ϕ at
λk. The subgradient algorithm for convex optimization with
appropriate step sizes is proven to converge to a minimum (see
[12]). Note that Algorithm 2 is an approximation algorithm
because the stopping criterion is defined by the number of
iterations. In the electricity market model that we assumed,
the ISO has to send the information to the supplier and
the consumer at each iteration, and vice versa. Therefore,
it is unrealistic to iterate many times. Moreover, although
the necessary and sufficient optimality conditions for (12)
can be obtained by modifying [9, eq.(9)], we have to solve
an additional convex quadratic program [9, eq.(12)] at each
iteration in order to check the conditions. These calculation
may cost high. The numerical results in the next section show
that Algorithm 2 reduces the uplift payment enough small in
a few iterations. Thus it would not be a big disadvantage to
define the stopping criterion by the number of iteration.
V. NUMERICAL EXPERIMENTS
Here, we present numerical experiments that confirm the
efficiency of our pricing model and algorithm in reducing
uplift payments. We assume that the ISO makes the next day’s
pricing decision hourly, i.e., a day-ahead market. We did the
numerical experiments on a Intel Core i5 M540 processor
(2.53 GHz) and 4GB of physical memory with Windows
7 Professional 64bit Service Pack 1. Numerical algorithms
were written in R language version 3.0.1. The GNU Linear
Programming Kit package of version 0.3-10 was used for
solving linear programming and mixed integer programming
problems.
A. Cost functions
First, we shall consider cost functions of the supplier. We
used the examples from Gribik et al. [5] and Hogan et al.
[4] (shown in TABLEs I and II). The example from [4] is
the modification of Scarf example [13]. The generators of
the examples have piece-wise linear variable cost functions.
The four different cost functions with the two examples are
illustrated in Fig. 6. ‘UCP’ means the optimal value function
v(y) of the UCP (8), i.e., the actual cost function for the
supplier. ‘Dispatchable’ means the optimal value function
6TABLE I
GRIBIK EXAMPLE [5]
Generators
A B C
Var1 Var2 Var1 Var2 Var1 Var2
Capacity (MW) 100 100 100 100 100 100
Minimum output (MW) 0 0 0
Startup cost ($) 0 6000 8000
Var cost 1 ($/MW) 65 40 25
Var cost 2 ($/MW) 110 90 35
Number of units 1 1 1
TABLE II
MODIFIED SCARF EXAMPLE [4]
Generators
Smokestack High Tech MedTech
Capacity 16 7 6
Minimum Output 0 0 2
Startup Cost 53 30 0
Var cost 3 2 7
Number of Units 6 5 5
of the continuous relaxation model of (8); i.e., the model
replaces the 0-1 integer constraints zj ∈ {0, 1} in (8) by
0 ≤ zj ≤ 1 for all j. The dispatchable pricing model in
[5] uses a subgradient of ‘Dispatchable’ as a price. We used
this model for comparison of the uplift payments. ‘No Startup’
means the optimal value function of (8) that ignores the startup
cost of the generators, i.e., (8) with Sj = 0 for all j. We
also used a quadratic cost function that approximates ‘No
Startup’ and that satisfies the assumption of existing convex
cost models [2], [3] (i.e., Assumption 1).
We can use a smooth and convex function approximating
‘UCP’ in the existing models. However, the use of such
function is unrealistic since the explicit function form of
‘UCP’ is generally too complicated to compute as we noted
in Section III. Note that our model doesn’t need to calculate
‘UCP’, although our model sets a subgradient of the convex
hull of ‘UCP’ as a price.
B. Demand function
Following [3], we used the hourly demand function,
Dt(λ) = µ1νd1,t + µ2(1 + δ2,t)d(λ), (14)
where µ1, µ2, ν are positive parameters, d1,t is a positive
constant, and δ2,t is a random variable distributed with
0 100 200 300 400 500 600
0
10
00
0
30
00
0
50
00
0
Demand (MW)
To
ta
l c
os
t ($
)
Gribik example
0
10
00
0
30
00
0
50
00
0
0
10
00
0
30
00
0
50
00
0
0
10
00
0
30
00
0
50
00
0
UCP
Dispatchable
No Startup
0.1*x^2
U1
0
10
00
0
30
00
0
50
00
0
0 50 100 150
0
20
0
40
0
60
0
80
0
10
00
Demand
To
ta
l c
os
t
Scarf example
0
20
0
40
0
60
0
80
0
10
00
0
20
0
40
0
60
0
80
0
10
00
0
20
0
40
0
60
0
80
0
10
00 UCP
Dispatchable
No Startup
0.022*x^2
U1
0
20
0
40
0
60
0
80
0
10
00
Fig. 6. Cost and utility functions
TABLE III
PARAMETER SETTINGS FOR DEMAND FUNCTION (14)
N a ν µ1 µ2
Gribik 100 3.9× 104 0.01 0.8 0.2
Scarf 100 455 0.0025 0.8 0.2
TABLE IV
SUMMARY OF d1,t
min mean max
d1,t 28340.0 41086.7 50780.0
N (0, 0.012) (t = 1, 2, . . . , 24). The first term in (14) repre-
sents the minimum necessary demand, and the second term in
(14) represents the swing in demand depending on prices. We
used actual hourly demand data of the Tokyo Electric Power
Company from 0:00 to 23:00 August 30, 2012 [14] as d1,t
(t = 1, 2, ..., 24). ν is a scale parameter to adapt the demand
to the examples’ size. We defined d(λ) as a solution of the
following utility maximization problem:
d(λ) := arg max
d≥0
{u(d)− λd},
where u(d) is a logarithmic utility function a log(d) with
a positive parameter a. Positive parameters a, µ1, µ2 are
adjusted so that the sum of simulated hourly demands Dt(λNt )
remained nearly equal to the sum of the scaled actual hourly
demands νd1,t, i.e.,
∑24
t=1
Dt(λ
N
t ) ≈ ν
∑24
t=1
d1,t.
Parameter settings for the demand function (14) are shown in
the TABLE III.
C. Utility function
In Section II, we assumed that the consumer determines
their demand Dt to maximize their utility, i.e.,
Dt(λ) = arg max
D≥0
{Ut(D)− λD},
where Ut is a utility function. In the case that the demand
function Dt is given by (14), Ut can be represented as follows:
Ut(D) = aµ2(1 + δ2,t) log(D − µ1νd1) + C,
where C is a constant. The concave lines in Fig. 6 illustrate
U1(D) with C = 20000 for Gribik example and C = 500
for Scarf example. The margin between U1(D) and ‘UCP’
represents the social welfare (3) under the condition that the
supply and demand are equal.
D. Comparison of pricing models
1) Uplift payments: First, let us compare the uplift pay-
ments of our model with the convex cost model in [2], [3]. The
convex cost model uses the quadratic functions in Fig. 6 as cost
functions. Its electricity price is given by a locational marginal
price (LMP) (see [2], [3] for details). On the other hand, our
electricity price is given by the CHP. The hourly optimal prices
λ∗t (t = 1, 2, . . . , 24) for our model were calculated with (12),
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Fig. 8. Hourly equilibrium demand.
whereas optimal prices for the existing convex cost model
were calculated with [3, eq.(7)]. Each point in Fig. 7 shows
the relation between the equilibrium demand Dt(λ∗t ) and the
uplift payments Π(λ∗t , Dt(λ∗t )) for the hourly optimal prices
λ∗t (t = 1, 2, . . . , 24). The solid (dashed) line illustrates the
uplift payments with the CHP (dispatchable pricing) model in
[5] at each fixed demand. Note that the solid line shows the
theoretical lower bound of the uplift payments at each demand.
In our model, the uplift payments accrue less than half that of
the convex cost model.
2) Demand, utility, and profit: Fig. 8 illustrates the hourly
equilibrium demand Dt(λ∗t ). In each example, our model tends
to lead less demand than that of the convex cost model,
especially in the early morning. It is because our model tends
to set higher prices than that of the existing model due to
the startup costs (as shown in TABLE V); Especially at an
early hour, the startup costs occupy largely in total cost.
TABLE V
SUMMARY OF SIMULATED PRICES
min mean max
Gribik CHP 87.1 94.0 95.2
LMP 65.6 82.2 95.3
Scarf CHP 6.3 6.3 6.4
LMP 3.6 4.5 5.2
TABLE VI
SUM OF SIMULATED RESULTS WITH GRIBIK EXAMPLE
ν
∑
d1,t LMP CHP
Demand 9860.8 9860.4 9570.7
Consumer’s utility NA 354572.9 249772.4
Supplier’s profit NA 70362.1 181574.5
Social welfare NA 424935.0 431346.9
TABLE VII
SUM OF SIMULATED RESULTS WITH SCARF EXAMPLE
ν
∑
d1,t LMP CHP
Demand 2465.2 2465.368 2318.659
Consumer’s utility NA 7248.106 3203.201
Supplier’s profit NA -4253.82 -31.5361
Social welfare NA 2375.12 1802.465
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The sum of hourly results are summarized in TABLE VI and
VII. Since our model tends to set the price higher, demand
and consumer’s utility would be lower and supplier’s profit
would be higher. On Scarf example, the supplier’s profit takes
negative value. Because it is difficult to reap profit under
the price using a subgradient (or the gradient) in the case
that a cost function is almost linear (even in such a case,
our model achieves more preferable results for the supplier
than the convex cost model). If the ISO sets higher prices
than LMPs and CHPs, the supplier may make positive profit.
However, such prices would increase the uplift payments.
3) Social welfare: While the social welfare of our model is
larger than that of the convex cost model for Gribik example, it
comes out opposite results for Scarf example (see TABLEs VI
and VII). Although our model minimizes the uplift payments,
we cannot say that our model leads larger social welfare.
E. Comparison of pricing algorithms
Next, let us investigate the performance of pricing algo-
rithms. The algorithm based on the steepest descent method
[3] was used for the convex cost model. We choose the step
sizes, which are used in Algorithm 1 in [3] and Algorithm
2 in this paper, as γk = 1/10k for Gribik example and as
γk = 1/100k for Scarf example (k = 1, 2, . . . , N). The initial
price was λ0t = 100 for Gribik example and λ0t = 10 for Scarf
example (t = 1, 2, . . . , 24).
1) Change of uplift payments with respect to iterations.:
Fig. 9 shows the uplift payments on the price after the k-
th iteration λkt (t = 1, 2, . . . , 24, k = 1, 5, 10, 100) of our
algorithm (i.e., Algorithm 2). We can see that the prices of
our algorithm achieve lower uplift payments than those of the
convex cost model (i.e., ‘LMP’ in Fig. 7) in a few iteration.
Furthermore, after about 10 iterations, the uplift payments
reach sufficiently close to the solid line. This implies that the
prices λkt are almost the same as CHPs. Under the pricing
scheme that we assumed, the market participants have to show
prices or levels of consumption and production to each other at
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Fig. 10. Change of the uplift payments with respect to computational time
for 100 iterations.
each iteration. Therefore, it is unrealistic to iterate many times.
Our model shows smaller uplift payments than the convex cost
model within a realistic number of iterations.
2) Change of the uplift payments with respect to compu-
tational time: While we only show the results at 1:00 (i.e.,
t = 2) in Fig. 10 for lack of space, remaining time has similar
numerical results. On Gribik example, the convex cost model
increases the uplift payments with computational time, since
the uplift payments for the initial price λ0t are smaller than
ones for the LMPs. By contrast, our model decreases the uplift
payments with computational time. On Scarf example, the both
algorithms decrease the uplift payments. The algorithm for the
convex cost model (i.e., Algorithm 1 in [3]) reduces the uplift
payments faster than one for our model (i.e., Algorithm 2 in
this paper) at first, since it takes less computational time for
an iteration. However, we can see that the algorithm for our
model leads less uplift payments than one for the convex cost
model a short time later.
VI. CONCLUSION
This paper provided a new dynamic pricing model based
on the CHP approach which has not been used in the context
of dynamic pricing. We first considered a nonconvex cost
function within the settings of the UCP, and added it to a social
welfare maximization problem. We proved that a solution of
its dual problem (i.e., Lagrange multiplier) gives the CHP.
This implies that our model minimizes the uplift payment for
an equilibrium demand. Since our model itself is formulated
as a mixed integer programming problem, and moreover, the
objective function of our model would be nonsmooth, it is
difficult to solve our model exactly. Therefore, we provided
an iterative approximation algorithm based on the subgradient
method. Numerical experiment showed our pricing model led
to smaller uplift payment compared with existing LMP models
with convex cost functions. In addition, our pricing algorithm
reduced the uplift payments in a few iterations and a little
computational time.
In our numerical experiment, we used examples where gen-
erators have piece-wise linear cost functions. Thus we could
use a mixed integer programming solver. We are planning
to investigate ways to deal general nonlinear variable cost
functions. We are also planning to extend our model to a multi-
agent and multi-period one with network constraints as in [4].
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